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BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
MELISSA B. JACOBY*
The recent financial crisis has generated a sharp shift in
public discourse about, and regulatory interest in, the federal
bankruptcy system and financially distressed families. Once, the
news media were disproportionately fascinated by the fallen
executive with a house in Florida that his creditors could not
touch. Today, the featured debtor is more likely to be the low-
income homeowner whose mistake was answering the door when a
dishonest mortgage broker came calling. Just a few short years
ago, lawmakers overwhelmingly supported a giant reform bill, the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA),1 based partly on the notion that bankruptcy judges
had too much discretion and bankruptcy professionals were not to
be trusted. BAPCPA was well understood to increase the cost
and decrease the effectiveness of bankruptcy relief for filers, with
little attention to how this might affect the stability of their
homeownership. Now, a new bankruptcy reform bill is touted as
granting bankruptcy judges more flexibility to stabilize mortgages
* George R. Ward Professor of Law and Faculty Fellow, Center for Urban and
Regional Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This is an updated
version of a portion of my remarks made on October 6, 2008. Thanks to Lissa
Broome for inviting me to participate and to Adam Feibelman, Elizabeth Gibson,
and Mark Weidemaier for helpful comments. Much of what I say here about the
operation of the bankruptcy system, bankruptcy reform, and mortgage delinquency
management has been developed in my previously-published scholarship. Rather
than cite my work for each point, I invite those with interest to look at those articles
on my Berkeley Electronic Press Selected Works Page, http://works.bepress.com/
melissajacoby/, or my Social Science Research Network Page, http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?perjid=224683.
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 19 Stat. 23 (codified in 11 U.S.C.S §§ 101-1501).
2. See Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 94; see also
Karen Gross, Kathryn R. Heidt, & Lois R. Lupica, Legislative Messaging and
Bankruptcy Law, 67 U. PiTt. L. REV. 497, 505 (2006) (discussing the distrust of
participants in the bankruptcy system conveyed in the 2005 amendments).
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and communities. With North Carolina Representative Brad
Miller helping to take the lead, the legislation expands bankruptcy
relief for debtors with the express intent to advance housing and
economic policy goals through mortgagor protection.4
Prior to the current financial crisis, housing policy experts
did not publicly reckon with the role of bankruptcy law in
managing mortgage delinquency, let alone the limits of bankruptcy
law to accomplish those goals. Regardless of their awareness, the
existing bankruptcy system has long served as a national anti-
deficiency law for debtors who part with their homes for less than
the amount of their mortgage debt. Through Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, in which debtors participate in a supervised
repayment plan, bankruptcy has allowed homeowners to reinstate
their mortgages in installment payments over the objections of
their mortgage holders, although statistics are scarce on actual
home retention. But beyond this reversal of acceleration clauses,
home mortgages usually cannot be restructured in bankruptcy
without consent of the mortgage holder - whoever that may be
these days. Consequently, unlike other secured debts, this
precludes imposing reductions in interest rate or principal on a
mortgage holder As lawmakers and housing policy experts seek
to limit the social costs of widespread foreclosure, they see that a
temporary relaxation of this special insulation of home mortgages
could prevent poorly underwritten mortgages from wreaking even
more havoc in communities and housing markets. In other words,
if bankruptcy law permitted a repayment plan to reduce the
interest rate on a subprime mortgage, perhaps a borrower in
3. See, e.g., Ronald D. Orol, Bill to Allow Judges to Modify Loans Passes
Hurdle; Judges Can Modify Mortgages According to Legislation OK'd by House
Panel, WALL STREET JOURNAL MARKETWATCH Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://
www.marketwatch.com/news/story/court-mortgage-modification-bill-passes-house/
story.aspx?guid=% 7BBB747EF3 %2DD3BF%2D4A8F%2DAA44%2D60896B90F2
46%7D&dist=msr 1 (reporting on passage of Conyers bill by House Judiciary
Committee, and framing legislation as being about bankruptcy judge discretion to
help prevent foreclosures).
4. Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, H.R. 225, 111th
Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Rep. Miller); Helping Families Save their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act, S. 61, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Sen. Durbin); Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 200, 111th Cong. (2009)
(sponsored by Rep. Conyers).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5) (2007).
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default could keep her home and her neighbors would not see
further declines in their property values.6 If bankruptcy law
reduced the mortgage debt to the value of the collateral, perhaps
the borrower could see the potential upside in the future and have
less of incentive to abandon the home.7
In the 1 1 0 th Congress, even very limited versions of
mortgage modification legislation faltered. Chances of passage
looked dim. But the 1 1 1 th Congress brings some new lawmakers,
an even more distressed financial climate, and unexpected allies.
Although trade associations continue to assert industry opposition,
the Wall Street Journal declared that the legislation cleared a "key
hurdle" when Citigroup withdrew its own opposition in early
January 2009.' Many state attorneys general, including North
Carolina's, have offered support.9 The expansion of bankruptcy's
mortgagor protection role, at least temporarily, seems plausible, if
not imminent.
To the extent that some sort of government mandate of
modifications is needed, building an emergency response into an
existing legal infrastructure makes sense. Indeed, had Congress
acted a year ago, as Representative Miller and the Center for
Responsible Lending encouraged them to do, perhaps things
would be better today. But administering this response through
the bankruptcy system does pose challenges. Those challenges
6. Rich Leonard, A Win-Win Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2008,
at A29 (reporting on example of homeowner who could retain her mortgage if the
interest rate on her refinanced mortgage were reduced, and discussing benefits to her
community of doing so).
7. As Quercia & Stegman explain in a literature review, an important group of
real estate finance scholars have characterized mortgage termination as a function of
the debtor's equity position. Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential
Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RESEARCH 341, 357-58
(1992) (explaining that borrowers will tend to exercise their option to default when
the net equity value in the house, plus the cost of exercising the option (such as
"transaction costs, moving costs, and the value of the borrower's reputation and
credit rating") falls below the amount of the mortgage.).
8. Elizabeth Williamson & Ruth Simon, Plans to Cut Foreclosure Rate Clears
Key Hurdle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1231445629148
65337.html.
9. See Letter from Attorneys General of Twenty-one States to United States
House Leadership (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/
2009 01 06 bankruptcy-code -attachmentl.pdf, Letter from Attorneys General of
Twenty-one States to United States Senate Leadership (Jan. 6, 2009), available at h
ttp://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/press/2009_01_06_bankruptcy-codeattachment2.pdf.
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arguably are tempered to the extent the pending reform would
create leverage for meaningful non-bankruptcy workouts (with
more assurance for servicers that they will not be sued by investors
for engaging in them). ° On the other hand, what happens to cases
actually processed through the bankruptcy system is hardly
irrelevant to the workout climate.
For example, although bankruptcy law is federal law, the
thick existing culture in each district will play some role in shaping
the impact of this emergency intervention, just like with any other
formal law enactment. This may not entail an intentional
subversion, but rather an inevitable filtering process. Pending
versions of the mortgage modification legislation build upon
Chapter 13 and thus incorporate a generation's worth, or more, of
beliefs about that part of the bankruptcy system. In some districts,
repeat player professionals - lawyers, trustees, judges, and others -
believe that a Chapter 13 plan must make significant promises to
pay old, unsecured debts beyond what many scholars believe the
Bankruptcy Code requires.1 If Congress has enacted legislation to
reduce monthly payment obligations of distressed homeowners, it
makes little sense to require every penny of the debtor's savings to
be redirected to pay old credit card debts. But at least in some
districts, this may be how the law is interpreted. To address this
issue, mortgage modification legislation could be accompanied by
the clear message that housing and broader economic policy
objectives supersede inferred goals of maximizing unsecured debt
payment beyond literal Bankruptcy Code requirements. Also,
Congress could convey that determinations of disposable income
for unsecured debt payment should build in cushions for
10. Priorities of the Next Administration: Use of TARP funds under EESA:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Services, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of
Michael Calhoun, President and Chief Operating Officer, Center for Responsible
Lending).
11. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make their Own
Informed Choices - A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 165 (1997); see also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One
Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J. 501, 519 (1993); Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal
Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARVARD
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 817 (1994); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized
Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L. J. 397, 415 (1994).
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emergencies to further enhance plan stability and the home saving
objective.
As a related matter, although stabilizing neighborhoods
and housing prices are explicit goals of the pending legislation,
bankruptcy law does not have clear mechanisms to account for
community interests unrepresented by an explicit legal claim or
right.' 2  I have previously discussed a more integrated home
mortgage delinquency management system that directly considers
core housing policy issues such as neighborhood stabilization. No
Chapter 13 plan confirmation requirement, however, explicitly
accounts for such interests. And no professional in the consumer
bankruptcy system is charged with representing them. This is
relevant because mortgage modification may be useful to
neighborhoods and communities to delay and stagger home loss,
even if it does not ultimately prevent home loss.' 4 Thus, even
when a Chapter 13 plan looks infeasible (and thus technically
should not be confirmed), perhaps a neighborhood would benefit
if home loss were forestalled a year or two. The broader goals of
this emergency legislation may lead judges to generously interpret
the requirement that plans be feasible, giving more debtors a
chance (even a long-shot chance) to save their homes. If this
happens, it becomes especially important that debtors' lawyers
stay involved with cases to handle plan adjustments or conversion
to Chapter 7 to avoid dismissal without discharge. And, again,
debtors should not be pushed to overpromise unsecured debt
payments.
12. See generally KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997); Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into
Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1031 (1994) (providing that
"community interests must be taken into account in both the corporate and personal
bankruptcy systems").
13. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2287 (2008). I also posited that compliance with Federal
Housing Authority guidelines on percentage of income committed to debt service
could be factored into approval of workout plans. Id.
14. Even with a mortgage modification, a debtor may still ultimately lose her
home if the modified mortgage payment will still consume too much of the debtor's
income, if non-mortgage homeownership costs remain high, or if the debtor's income
is too unstable.
15. Feasibility in chapter 13 means, according to the Bankruptcy Code, that "the
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the
plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2007).
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For a third challenge, we return to the subject with which
this commentary began: the climate and assumptions that
preceded the passage of BAPCPA in 2005. In the eight years it
took for BAPCPA to become law, overwhelming majorities of
elected representatives repeatedly voted in favor of a bill that
quite evidently would make bankruptcy harder for filers, including
distressed homeowners, in literally dozens of ways. Even if
BAPCPA did not contribute to the financial crisis,16 it has
undermined the goal of an efficient bankruptcy system that is
increasingly seen as important part of managing the current crisis.
After BAPCPA, filers seeking to save their homes in Chapter 13
pay substantially more in attorneys' fees and costs.17 In addition,
statutory drafting problems with BAPCPA have been well
documented.' 8 Disputes over this language continue to consume
disproportionate resources of the bankruptcy system that could be
productively directed to so many more pressing matters. In
addition, although other factors also are at work, some blame
BAPCPA's amendments to Chapter 11 and related provisions for
the inability of retailers and other businesses to reorganize. 9 As
16. Some researchers believe that the legislation did contribute to the crisis. See,
e.g., DONALD P. MORGAN, BENJAMIN CHARLES IVERSON, AND MATrHEW BOTSCH,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT No. 358, SEISMIC EFFECTS OF
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM (Nov. 2008) (arguing that the 2005 amendments
contributed to the surge in subprime foreclosures by making it harder for debtors to
discharge unsecured debt so that they could concentrate their resources on their
mortgages).
17. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
2005, GAO-08-697 (JUNE 2008) ("For chapter 13 cases, our review found the standard
attorney fee approved by courts (and which, in practice, is the fee Chapter 13
attorneys typically charge their clients) rose in nearly all the districts and divisions
with such fees. In more than half of these cases, the increase was 55 percent or
more."); see also id. at 21-27 (reviewing fees in greater detail and finding that the
median chapter 13 standard had moved from $2,000 just prior to the act to $3,000, a
few months after the effective date).
18. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 2, at 97 ("The problems with the 2005 Act are
breathtaking. There are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging paragraphs, and
inconsistencies. Worse, there are largely pointless but burdensome new
requirements.").
19. See Peter Lattman & Jeffrey McCracken, Clock Ticks for Circuit City Sale,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12320654239698 8067.html
(citing financial advisory spokesperson describing as a "real killer" the 2005 limits
imposed on time to assume or reject non-residential real property leases, and noting
"It's not a coincidence all these liquidations are going on since the code changed.").
See generally Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of
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retailers fail and workers lose jobs, mortgage problems may
expand, increasing the pressure on the bankruptcy system.
One possible supplemental response is to repeal BAPCPA.
It took a financial crisis to help the public understand the
bankruptcy system and its role in housing policy, and thus why
BAPCPA was a bad idea. It may take a repeal of BAPCPA to
help get us back on track.
Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 603 (2005) (stating that
the 2005 amendments place burdens on debtors that impair their ability to
reorganize).
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